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Abstract: 
This study examines the relationship between Board of director attributes and financial performance of listed firms 
in Uganda. Board attributes of board size, Non-executive directors (board independence) and directors’ 
shareholding are examined while controlling for firm size and leverage. The study uses a cross sectional research 
design, employing panel data of listed firms in Uganda for a period of four years. Financial and board attributes 
information is collected from annual reports of each firm. The study finds that non executive director’s 
independence on board and large boards increase firm performance. We do not provide evidence to suggest that 
director’s shareholding affects firm performance differently. Thus this study is consistent with evidence that shows 
the importance of board of directors’ attributes on firm´s financial performance. 
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1.0 Introduction 
This study examines the role of effective corporate governance on firm financial performance. Theory argues that, 
agency problem (conflict) is due to separation of ownership and control.  The agency conflict increases due to 
information asymmetry, moral hazard, time horizon conflicts and risk aversion. The owners of the firm need to 
reduce the opportunistic behavior of the managers in order to align managers’ interests with those of the owners if 
they are to maximize shareholder value (Jensen and Meckling, 1976 and Fama 1980) 
Existing evidence suggests that effective boards of directors reduce agency conflict further leading to increase 
in firm value or firm financial performance by reducing on information asymmetry. Thus this study argues that, 
corporate boards is an internal governance mechanism designed to control self-interested management from 
unscrupulous behaviors (Heracleous, 2001; Guan et al., 2007). Corporate board works as an intermediate arm of 
the firm that interfaces between the shareholders and the managers (John and Sebet, 1998; Stiles and Taylor, 2001). 
Thus its existence impact on a firm’s financial performance (Ho and Williams, 2003; Mangena and Chamisa, 2008; 
Vafeas and Theodorau, 1998; Zahra and Peace, 1989).   
Therefore we argue that, financial performance of a firm is substantially impacted by the board of directors’ 
decisions. It attracts investment and helps in maximizing the company’s funds, reinforcing the company’s pillars 
and this results in increased financial performance (Waggoner, Neely and Kennerley, 1999). Financial 
performance also relates to the process by using which constrained resources at an organization’s disposal are 
utilized correctly and effectively in reaching the common goal of the organization for both existing and future 
opportunities (Marn and Romuald, 2012; Yasser et al, 2011).  
Studies examining the effect of a board’s composition on firm financial performance in general find support 
for the notion that a majority of non-executive directors improve firm financial performance (Abidin et al., 2009; 
Beasley 1996; Brown and Caylor, 2004;Charitou et al., 2007;Ho and Williams, 2003;Jackling andJohl, 2009; 
Mangena and Chamisa, 2008;Peasnell et al., 2001; Perry and Shivdasani, 2005; Rhoades et al., 2000; Rosenstein 
and Wyatt, 1990;Shleifer and Vishny, 1997;Weir et al., 2002). On the other hand their findings to suggest that 
there is a negative or no relationship between the independent non-executive directors and firm financial 
performance (Bhagat and Black, 2000; Dalton et al., 1998; Daily and Dalton, 1992; Dulewicz and Herbert, 2004; 
Erickson et al., 2005; Heracleous, 2001; Hsu, 2010; Shivdasani and Zenner, 2002; Weir and Laing, 2001 Yermack, 
1996). 
There are also arguments that optimum number of board members of a company should be between seven 
and eight (Firsteberg and Malkiel, 1994; Jensen, 1993; Lipton and Lorsch, 1992; Muriithi, 2011; Okiro ,2006). 
The Larger the size of the board the higher the likelihood that the performance of that company will be less than 
optimal (Ali and Nasir, 2014; Belkhir, 2009; Guest, 2009; Gilland Obradovich, 2012; Jensen, 1993; Ibrahim et al., 
2011). However, other findings such as Al-Matariet al., (2014) and Yasser et al., (2011) find board size to be 
positively but insignificantly related to financial performance. Similarly there argues to suggest that larger board 
size is more effective in performance (Abidin et al., 2009; Beasley and Salterio, 2001; Chaganti et al., 1985; and 
Coles et al., 2004). Other studies could not find any relationship (Ho and Williams, 2003; Magena and Chamisa, 
2008). 
Finally the agency theory supports the notion that greater directors’ shareholding affects firm financial 
performance positively. Empirical results support this notion (Bhagate and Black, 1999; McConnell et al., 2008 
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and; Morck et al., 1988; Seifert, Gonenc and Wright, 2005, Morck, Shleifer, andVishny, 1988; Yammeesri, 2003). 
On the other hand, some researchers found conflicting results. Shah et al., 2011 found a negative relationship 
between ownership concentration and firm performance. Other studies fail to establish any relationship (Abidin et 
al., 2009; Hoand Williams, 2003; Mangena and Chamisa, 2008; and Rosenstein and Wyatt, 1997).  
Berger and Patti (2002) argue that a firm’s financial performance is measured by how much ‘better off’ the 
shareholder is at the end of a period compared to how he was at the beginning. Suggesting the increase in value of 
shareholders from the beginning to the end of a given accounting period (Kakanda, Bello and Abba, 2016). This 
study uses Return on Assets (ROA) and Return on Equity (ROE) to measure financial performance.  Accounting-
based performance measures present the management actions outcome and are hence preferred over market-based 
measures when the relationship between board attributes and firm financial performance is being investigated 
Hutchinson and Gull(2004); Mashayekhi and Bazazb (2008). Furthermore, most studies provide reliable results 
and they are the most used accounting measures of financial performance (Clarkson, Richardson and Vasvari, 
2008; Ongore and K’Obonyo, 2015; Russo and Fouts, 1997; Stanwick and Stanwick, 2000).  
While good financial performance is a target of every rational business enterprise, many enterprises both in 
developing and developed economies have had challenges of poor financial performance (Akisimire, 2016). Bank 
for International Settlements in 2015 survey shows that in Uganda many firms did not have well constituted boards 
of directors, directors overstep their roles and get involved in micro management. Thus, there is failure to 
understand clearly the proper role of a board of directors in the running of a company or institution, in particular, 
what the oversight function of a board of directors actually entails. 
This study is limited to a few board of director attributes which included; independence of non-executive 
directors, directors’ shareholding and board size. We focus on these three board attributes because literature and 
the theoretical framework indicate that these are the major mechanisms that affect firm financial performance.The 
study looked at data for companies listed on the Uganda Securities Exchange for a period of four years (2013 - 
2016). This period is feasible for generalization considering the efforts made by Bank of Uganda, Capital Markets 
Authority and the Uganda Securities Exchange in monitoring, supervising and controlling the operations of the 
listed companies. A period of four years from 2013 to 2016 was also chosen because it is a period of economic 
stability in Uganda just after the economic volatility of the period 2007 to 2011.  
 
2.0 Literature Review 
Independence of Non-executive directors and financial performance 
The board is one of the monitoring mechanisms that the shareholders can use to monitor top management (Fama 
and Jensen, 1983). Board independence has been defined as the ratio of non-executive directors to total directors 
(Barisua, Tobira and Lenee, 2012; Marn and Romuald, 2012; Yasser, Entebang and Abu Mansur, 2011). An 
important issue in the recent debate on board reforms is the balance between executive and non-executive directors 
on the board with the emphasis being on making the board independent of management. Corporate governance 
guidelines recommend that companies should be headed and controlled by boards that can lead and monitor the 
company and that these boards ought to reflect a balance between executive and non-executive directors, 
preferably with a majority being non-executive directors who are independent of management, so that shareholders’ 
and other relevant stakeholders’ interests can be protected (King Report, 2002). Non-executive directors are 
viewed as representatives and protectors of the wider range of stakeholders. They are often appointed to help in 
managing the interests of a firm’s various stakeholders (Johnson and Greening, 1999; Wang and Dewhirst, 1992).  
Non-executive directors are expert decision makers in other enterprises, and the value of their capital depends 
on their performance as decision- making experts in other firms (Fama and Jensen, 1983). Non-executive directors’ 
appointments provide a signal to external markets that they are decision-making experts, who can understand the 
importance of decision control, and can work with decision systems (Vafeas and Theodouros, 1998). They need 
to fulfil their duties and responsibilities in order to protect their reputation capital so they can increase their future 
directorship opportunities (Beasley, 1996; Shivdasani, 1993). 
Many theories, including agency theory support the argument that the independent non-executive directors 
are instrumental to a firm’s performance (Wang and Dewhirst, 1992). It has been argued that firms with large 
proportions of outside directors on the board normally have less agency problems, and therefore, exhibit a better 
alignment between the interests of shareholders and those of management (Fernandes, 2005). Fama and Jensen 
(1983), Spencer (1983), and Jones and Goldberg (1982), argued that non-executive directors’ representation on 
the board increases: board independence, directors’ objectivity and enhances directors’ expertise. In general, 
studies examining the effect of board independence on firm financial performance found mixed results. Most 
literature related to the proportion of non-executive directors on the board showed that boards with a majority of 
non-executive directors are more active in protecting shareholders’ interests. Nicholson and Kiel (2007) argue that 
given their unparalleled knowledge of the corporation, inside directors are better placed to interrogate management 
proposals than can their independent counterparts. Brennan (2006) however, argues that non-executive directors 
are part-timers and therefore, do not possess requisite inside information about the business, and hence, may not 
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be competent enough to perform tasks assigned to them. He further argues that outside directors are creatures of 
the chief executive officers and therefore, are likely to forget their main purpose in the organization and align their 
own interests with those of the top management. This is especially true in jurisdictions where the chief executive 
is the sole source of information on potential nominees to the board (Ongore, Obonyo, OgutuandBosire, 2015).  
Other studies even suggested that non-executive directors do not have the required time, knowledge, skill and 
expertise to carry out their work effectively (Geneen, 1984; Vance, 1983). 
Studies examining the effect of a board independence on firm financial performance in general find support 
for the notion that a majority of non-executive directors improve firm financial performance. For example, some 
studies showed that boards with majority non-executive directors perform better (Abidin, Kamal and Jusoff ,2009; 
Beasley 1996; Brown and Caylor, 2004;Charitou, Louca and Vafeas, 2007; Ho and Williams, 2003;Jackling and 
Johl, 2009;Mangena and Chamisa, 2008; Peasnell, Pope and Young 2001; Perry and Shivdasani, 2005; Rhoades, 
Rechner and Sundaramurthy, 2000; Rosenstein &Wyatt, 1990;ShleiferandVishny, 1997) others report either 
negative or no relationship between the board composition and firm performance (Bhagat and Black,2000; Daily 
and Dalton, 1992;Dalton ,Daily, Ellstrand and Johnson,1998;Dulewicz and Herbert, 2004; Erickson, Park, Reising 
and Shin,2005;Heracleous, 2001; Hsu, 2010;Shivdasani and Zenner, 2002; Weir and Laing, 2001;Yermack, 1996).  
 
Board size and financial performance 
Board size is the magnitude of board of directors of a company; it is the total number of directors serving on the 
board of a company (Ogege and Boloupremo, 2014). Some studies argue that as board size increases, the position 
of the directors is improved which gives them more right to exercise their power in governing the organization, as 
the CEO dominance on the board is reduced (Zahra and Pearce, 1989). Lipton and Lorsch (1992) reported that 
number of board members of a company should be between seven and eight. This assertion is also consistent with 
the opinion of Jensen (1993). Muriithi (2011), in his study finds that it was apparent that the average size of the 
board of directors of eight members.  
Muriithi (2011) reported a positive relationship between board size and firm financial performance. Okiro 
(2006) established no relationship between size of the board and financial performance of firms. In this effect, 
boards that have eight or less members stand a chance to maintain better focus, participation, good interaction and 
meaningful debate (Firsteberg and Malkiel, 1994). However, a required number of board members depend on 
industry-specific and size of firms; for instance, banking industry is found to have board sizes that are larger than 
that of manufacturing industry (Adams and Mehran, 2003). Subsequently, evidence is provided that larger boards 
are assumed to have directors with heterogeneous educational and industrial background and skill that will help to 
enhance actions of the firm, hence, improving performance (Pfeffer, 1987; Herman, 1981; Bacon, 1973).  
There arguments that the larger the size of the board the higher the likelihood that the financial performance 
of that company will be less than optimal (Belkhir, 2004). Belkhir argues that communication, coordination of 
tasks and resolution-making effectiveness among a bigger size of people is a bit harder and entails a bigger 
financial burden than a smaller group of people. Jensen (1993) argues that whenever the size of the board goes 
beyond eight people, they are less likely to function effectively and efficiently. This would obviously undermine 
the monitoring role of the board of directors. He further argues that keeping boards small can help improve the 
financial performance of the organizations through efficient use of resources, and by avoiding procrastination in 
decision-making processes. Noticeably, Yermack reported that the inverse relationship between board size and the 
firm value weakens as the size of the board grew, meaning that the increase in incremental costs arose as the boards 
grew larger from small to medium and medium to large. Guest (2008), while examining the influence of board 
size on the performance of 2,746 UK listed companies over the period 1981-2002, found that the board size had a 
strong negative influence on profitability ratios (particularly, ROA (Return on Assets) and share returns.  
Moreover, the inverse association between board size and performance was heightened for larger firms that 
had engaged larger boards. Indeed, Guest (2008) in his endeavors supported the assertion that concerns of poor 
communication and inefficient decision-making challenged the effectiveness of large boards. Gill and Obradovich 
(2012) found that larger board size negatively affects the value of American firms. Other stream of studies that 
found negative relationship between board size and firm performance include (Ali and Nasir, 2014; Ibrahim and 
Abdul Samed, 2011) among others. However, Yasser, Entebang and Abu Mansor, 2011) found a significant 
positive relationship between board size and performance measured by return on equity (ROE). 
Al-Matari, Al-SwidiandFaudziah (2014) also finds that board size to be positively but insignificantly related 
to financial performance (measured by ROA). Other studies also argue that larger board size is more effective in 
performance (Abidin et al., 2009; Beasley and Salterio, 2001; Chaganti, Mahjan, and Sharma, 1985; Coles, Daniel 
and Naveen, 2008). Other studies could not find any relationship (Ho and Williams, 2003; Magena and Chamisa, 
2008).  
 
Directors’ shareholding and financial performance 
Directors’ shareholding is one of the internal governance mechanisms to control the agency problem. Following 
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Jensen and Meckling (1976), several studies examine the relationship between directors’ shareholding and 
performance (Adams & Santos, 2006; Bhagat and Black, 1999; Demsetz, 1983; Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Demsetz 
and Villalonga, 2001; Finkelstein, 1992; Ho and Williams, 2003; MangenaandChamisa, 2008; McConnell,Servaes, 
andLins, 2008; Morck, Shleifer and Vishny, 1988). Fama (1980) suggests that directors’ ownership helps to reduce 
the conflict of interest that exists between directors and shareholders. Directors who hold large stake in the firm 
are more likely to monitor management in order to protect their investments (Jensen, 1993). For example, large 
block holders, who have a strong incentive to closely monitor a firm, may acquire seats on the board, which 
enhances their ability to monitor effectively (Ahmed and Hadi, 2017). 
Prior studies have shown different results on how directors’ shareholding influences firm performance. 
Empirical studies generally support this notion. For example, Morcket al. (1988) attributes the increase of Tobin’s 
Q with ownership to the convergence of interests between directors and shareholders. Bhagat and Black (1999) 
found a significant relationship between the number of shares owned by directors and firm performance. They 
argue that the reason behind this phenomenon is that the increase in directors’ equity motivates directors to improve 
their monitoring of management and that improves firm performance. In contrast, they stress that this might be 
due to the inside information the directors have about the firm and its operations, thus they will increase their 
ownership to benefit from the firm’s success. Seifert, Gonenc and Wright (2005), Morck et al. (1988) and 
Yammeesri (2003) finds a positive relationship between insider ownership and firm performance. On the other 
hand, Demsetz (1983) argues that insider ownership is internally derived so it has no credible impact on firm value. 
Yammeesri (2003) found that government, financial institution, and bank shareholders ownership had no impact 
on profitability. Shah, Butt and Saeed (2011) found a negative relation between directors’ shareholding and firm 
performance because family owned firms in Pakistan dominate the board and there is lack of expertise, diversity 
and new knowledge for achieving operational efficiency.  
There is evidence that directors’ ownership and performance to be endogenous. Demsetz results were 
supported by (Cho, 1998; Holderness et al., 1999; and Demsetz and Villalonga, 2001.) Cho (1998) tested a reverse 
relationship between ownership and performance, using a cross-sectional 2-SLS regression to model. He found 
investment affects corporate value positively which in turn affects directors’ ownership. Another aspect of 
corporate governance was investigated by Ho and Williams (2003); and Abidin et al. (2009), who examined 
directors’ ownership and the value added by a firms’ intellectual capital. Ho and Williams (2003) tested the 
ownership and value added in three countries (South Africa, Sweden, and the UK) and found that the coefficient 
for directors’ shareholding is significantly positive for Swedish firms, but not significant for the South Africa and 
UK samples. Abidin et al. (2009) support Ho and Williams’ (2003) findings for South African firms. Mangena 
and Chamisa (2008) investigated the impact of directors’ ownership on the incidence of listing suspensions by the 
JSE Securities Exchange of South Africa. They find an insignificant relationship between directors’ ownership 
and the suspension of firms by the JSE Securities Exchange.  
The agency theory supports the notion that higher directors’ shareholding affects firm performance positively. 
Empirical results support this notion (Bhagate and Black, 1999; McConnell et al., 2008 and; Morck et al., 1988). 
However, some studies fail to establish any relationship (Abidin et al., 2009; Ho and Williams, 2003; Mangena 
and Chamisa, 2008; Rosenstein and Wyatt, 1997).  
 
3.0 Methodology 
The study is comprised of firms listed on the Uganda Securities Exchange. Information on the board attributes of 
board composition, directors’ shareholding, leadership structure and board size and financial information was 
primarily collected from annual reports of each company listed on the Uganda Securities Exchange for the 2013 
to 2016. According to the USE website, the companies listed were 16. However, two of the firms had missing 
annual reports by the time of data collection, leaving a total of 14 firms for this study with 56firm year observations.   
Relevant information was  extracted following a data collection guide on board attributes such as board size, 
number of non-executive director’s, and directors’ shareholding, total assets, debt and equity among others which 
were collected from the annual reports and later transformed into measures that describe the variables with respect 
to the study objectives. Financial information required for the study was primarily compiled from the following, 
income statements, statements of financial position, as well as from the notes on the financial statements. 
Information on the board attributes of board composition, directors’ shareholding, leadership structure and board 
size were taken primarily from the annual reports of each company specifically the corporate governance section 
of the report. 
This study examined three categories of board attributes and these were; board independence, directors’ 
shareholding and board size. These were measured as below: 
 
Board composition refers to the ratio of non-executive directors to total number of directors in the 
company.Board composition =
    
 !"   
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Directors’ shareholding refers to the proportion of shares held by directors’ in the company. 
Directors%shareholding =
Total number of shares held by directors
Total company shares
 
Board size refers to the total number of directors on a board. Board size was measured using the total number 
of directors on the board. 
The firm’s financial performance, measured in terms of return on assets (ROA) and return on equity, are the 
dependent variables. The ROA measures the capacity of a firm’s assets to generate profits and it is considered to 
be a key factor in determining the firm’s future investment. ROA is the indicator as what profit the company is 
earning against its available resources and was measured as: 
ROA =
Profit after tax
Total Assets
 
Return on Equity (ROE) indicates how much the company is earning to the ratio of investment of shareholders. 
It was measured as: 
ROE =
Profit after Tax
Equity
 
 
The Control variables used in this study include; 
Firm size was measured using the natural logarithm of total assets (Anderson &Reeb, 2003; Barontini and Caprio, 
2006; Wang, 2006). 
Leverage (Borrowing level) was measured as the quotient between long term debt and long-term debt and 
Equity (Coles, Daniel and Naveen, 2005; Wang, 2006). 
After determining the independent variables, dependent variables, and control variables, to analyse the 
respective relationships defined in prior sections a linear multiple regression analysis was used as a tool to examine 
the relationship between board attributes, control variables and firm’s performance.  
The regression models are given in the equations below: 
ROA = β0 + β1 BI+ β2BS + β3DS +5678+59: +εi;……………………………………..(i) 
ROE = β0+ β1 BI+ β2BS + β3DS +5678+59: +εi;…………………………………….(ii) 
Where: 
ROA (Return on Assets and ROE (Return on Equity) are the dependent variables;  
β Represent the slope of the independent variables. The independent variables are Board Independence 
(BI), board size (BS), directors’ shareholding (DS) and control variables leverage (L) and Firm size (FS) 
and εi is normally distributed with a mean equal to zero. 
 
4.0 Results 
The following descriptive statistics were obtained from the analysis. 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for Board attributes (Objective 1) 
Variable  N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
Non-executive directors 56 0.400 1.000 0.8204 0.1251 
Board size 56 5 16 10.30 2.7430 
Directors’ shareholding 56 0.000 0.525 0.0649 0.1270 
Return on assets (ROA) 56 -0.141 0.221 0.0558 0.0669 
Return on equity (ROE) 56 -0.262 0.318 0.1218 0.1200 
lnFS 56 19.93 30.62 27.265 2.6565 
Leverage 56 0.000 1.659 0.2932 0.3693 
Where 
 Board composition -ratio of non-executive directors to total number of directors in the company.  
 Directors’ shareholding-proportion of shares held by directors’ in the company. 
 Board size- total number of directors on the board.  
 lnFS-the natural logarithm of total assets  
 Leverage- the quotient between long term debt and long-term debt and Equity 
 ROA-ratio of profit after tax to total assets 
 ROE-ratio of profit after tax to equity 
On average, the board of directors are composed of 82% non-executive directors. This is consistent with the 
requirements of the corporate governance code of the United Kingdom that suggests that the board of directors 
should be composed of more than 50% of non-executive directors of which more than a half should be independent. 
The average board size is of 10 board members. This is slightly higher than average board size of between seven 
to eight as advocated by Lipton and Lorsch (1992) and Jensen (1993). Directors’ shareholding is on average is on 
average of 6% with a maximum executive ownership of 52.5% of the firm.On average the Return on assets is at 
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5.58% with the average Return of equity is 12.18%.  
 
4.4 Correlation analysis 
Table 2: Pearson Correlations Matrix 
 Non-executive 
directors 
Board 
size 
Directors’ 
shareholding 
lnFS Leverage ROA ROE 
Non-executive 
directors 
1       
Board size 0.251 
0.062 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Directors’ 
shareholding 
0.069 
0.615 
0.128 
0.347 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
lnFS 0.355** 
0.007 
0.512** 
0.000 
0.362** 
0.006 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Leverage -0.187 
0.169 
.279* 
0.037 
.391** 
0.003 
0.387** 
0.003 
1 
 
 
 
 
 
ROA 0.160** 
0.038 
0.174** 
0.019 
-0.165 
0.224 
-0.211 
0.118 
-0.356** 
0.007 
1 
 
 
 
ROE 0.059** 
0.034 
0.148** 
0. 007 
-0.247 
0.067 
0.172 
0.205 
-0.400** 
0.002 
0.797** 
0.000 
1 
 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 
The findings in table 2 above using a Pearson correlation coefficient tests provide preliminary evidence on 
the relationship between board attributes and firm performance.  We show that there is a positive relationship 
between Board size, non executive director independence and firm performance.  The relationship between 
director’s shareholding and firm performance is insignificant. The study also finds a significant negative 
relationship between leverage and firm performance. This implies that as leverage increases, the financial 
performance of a firm reduces or deteriorates. These findings are consistent with Williams (2001) who argues that 
a high proportion of debt may lead a firm to focus primarily on the needs of debt holders and that firms with a high 
leverage ratio may lack attractiveness to investors, and will have a higher interest payments, which reflect on the 
risks and returns of the firm. 
Table 3:   Regression Analysis for ROE 
Model  Unstandardized coefficients Standardized coefficients  
 β Std error Β  T - stat  P value 
Constant  -0.239 0.144  -1.655 0.104 
Non-executive directors 0.395 0.117 0.412 3.393 0.001 
Board size -0.008 0.005 0.179 1.448 0.054 
Director shareholding -0.169 0.111 -0.179 -1.519 0.135 
InFS 0.025 0.006 0.551 3.901 0.000 
Leverage -0.218 0.042 -0.670 -5.185 0.000 
Dependent variable is  Return on Equity 
From table 3, the results indicate that there is a significant positive relationship between board independence 
and ROE (β=-0.412and p=0.001). These findings are consistent with the argument that a greater proportion of 
outside independent directors on the board have positive impact on firm financial performance firms because large 
proportions of outside directors on the board normally have less agency problems, and therefore, exhibit a better 
alignment between the interests of shareholders and those of management (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Fernandes, 
2005; Jackling and Johl, 2009; Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). The results also show that 
there no relationship between board size and ROE (β=0.179, p=0.054). The results in table 3 also suggest that 
there is no a relationship between directors’ shareholding and ROE (β=-0.179, p=0.054).  
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Table 4:   Regression   Analysis for ROA 
Model  Unstandardized coefficients Standardized coefficients  
 Β Std error Β  T - stat P value 
Constant  0.214 0.089  2.409 0.020 
Non-executive directors 0.170 0.072 0.318 2.372 0.022 
Board size -0.012 0.003 -0.471 3.448 0.001 
Director shareholding 0.028 0.068 0.053 0.404 0.688 
InFS -0.004 0.004 -0.163 -1.044 0.301 
Leverage -0.091 0.026 -0.504 -3.533 0.001 
Dependent variable is  Return on Assets 
Looking at the coefficient data in table 4, we can see that there is a significant a positive relationship between 
non executive directors independence and ROA (β=-0.318 and p=0.022). This is similar to the findings using ROE. 
The results also show that there is a significant positive relationship between board size and ROA (β=0.471, 
p=0.00). Some studies report similar results and argue that larger boards have directors with heterogeneous 
educational and industrial background and skill that will help to enhance actions of the firm, hence, improving 
performance (Pfeffer, 1987; Herman, 1981; Bacon, 1973).  The results in table 3 indicate that there is no 
relationship between directors’ shareholding and ROA (β=0.053, p=0.688). The study finds a significant negative 
relationship between leverage and ROA (β=-0.504 and p=0.001 which is less than 0.05). These finds are consistent 
with Williams (2001) who finds that as companies increase long-term debt financing, their financial performance 
deteriorates.  
 
5.0 Contribution and Implications 
The purpose of the study was to examine the relationship between Board attributes and financial performance. 
ROA and ROE were used to measure the firm´s financial performance. Three selected board attributes of board 
size, Non-executive directors (board independence) and directors’ shareholding were considered for this study. In 
order to minimize the impact of other variables that could explain the relationship between board attributes and 
firm financial performance, two control variables of firm size and leverage were also included in this study.  
The results show that there is a significant positive relationship between the presences of high number of non-
executive directors on the board of directors (board independence) firm financial performance. The results 
therefore suggest that increase in number of non-executive directors increases firm financial performance.  The 
results also show that there is a significant positive relationship between board size and ROA. This implies that as 
members on the board increase, firm financial performance also improves.  We find no evidence to suggest that 
Director Shareholding influences firm financial performance differently. Overall, the results show the importance 
of directors’ attributes on firm´s financial performance and give several insights on how firms can improve their 
board effectiveness and performance. 
This study contributes to the literature on corporate governance specifically board attributes of board size, 
board independence and directors’ shareholding and financial performance in Uganda,by providing an empirical 
analysis of the relationship between board attributes and firm financial performance. The study has also established 
significant findings that will be very useful to operations of capital markets in Uganda and other firms listed and 
non-listed.  
The study also recommends that companies should continuously develop and maintain corporate governance 
principles and mechanisms in place especially well constituted boards in terms of size and independence as these 
board attributes significantly influence how well a firm performs.  
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